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NOTE
A TOAST TO THE DIGNITY OF STATES:
WHAT ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE PORTENDS FOR DIRECT
SHIPMENT OF WINE
"The preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord
States the dignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign
entities. ,,1
I.

INTRODUCTION

It started out as just a simple bet between the Governors of
California and Florida-Governor Gray Davis agreed to send Florida
Governor Jeb Bush a case of California cabernet if his state's Oakland
Raiders lost to the Tampa Bay Buccaneers in Super Bowl XXXVII. 2 But
this simple bet grew quickly into a snafu when Governor Davis tried to
settle the bet and ship a case of wine to Florida, one of thirty-seven
states that restrict direct shipping of wine under Prohibition-era laws. 3
When confronted with the legal consequences of violating Florida's
strict direct shipment law, Governor Davis chose to avoid the potential
for being extradited and charged with a felony.4 Instead, he decided he
would just have to hand-carry two bottles to Governor Bush at a meeting
in Washington, D.C. 5 While Florida's law may seem bizarre, it
represents a common theme that runs through the patchwork of the fifty
states' direct shipment of wine laws. 6 As support for the opposing sides

of the direct shipment argument increases and media coverage grows,
federal courts around the nation are confronting the contentious issue of
1. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 745, 760 (2002) (citing In re

Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887)).
2. See Carol Emert, Bush Can't Pop Davis' Bottle; Wine Delivery Snafu Screws Up
Governors' Super Bowl Bet, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Jan. 30, 2003, at A2.
3. See id
4. See id.

5. See id.
6. See infra Part II.C.
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direct shipment of wine that implicates constitutional issues of
federalism, states' rights, and Commerce Clause power.
Since William Rehnquist became Chief Justice in 1986, the
Supreme Court, in construing the scope of the Eleventh Amendment, has
consistently upheld states' rights and has tipped the scales of federalism
in the states' favor.7 This interpretation of the Constitution does not bode
well for small wineries and wine aficionados who are fighting against
restrictive state shipping laws in courts across the country. Thus far,
several federal courts have considered the issue of directly shipping wine
to consumers' homes and analyzed it as a tug-of-war between the
Commerce Clause and the Twenty-First Amendment. 8 Because the
opinions vary on which constitutional provision wins out, it is likely that
the United States Supreme Court will make the final decision. What the
Court will decide is less of a mystery than might appear at first glance.
Recent Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence provides strong hints as to
how the Supreme Court would rule on direct shipment prohibitions.
In Part II, this Note will explain the "wine war" 9 that is currently
being waged in courts and legislatures in many states. The background
of the direct shipment of wine issue will be fleshed out, including a
discussion of the players in the legal battle and a summary of the states'
regulatory laws on direct shipment. Part III highlights the lower court
cases that have already been decided in the "war" and will review
commentaries that have been published concerning these decisions. In
Part IV, the Supreme Court's emphasis on the sovereignty and the
dignity of the States in its recent Eleventh Amendment cases will be
used, not for its specific constitutional subject matter, but as evidence of
the Court's current approach to issues concerning state power.'l Part V
uses Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence in discussing how the Supreme
Court may rule on the direct shipment issue considering its commitment
7.

See infra Part IV.

8. See, e.g., Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 849 (7th Cir. 2000);
Swedenburg v. Kelly, 232 F. Supp. 2d 135, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Beskind v. Easley, 197 F. Supp.
2d 464, 469 (W.D.N.C. 2002); Dickerson v. Bailey, 212 F. Supp. 2d 673, 678 (S.D. Tex. 2002);
Bolick v. Roberts, 199 F. Supp. 2d 397, 430 (E.D. Va. 2002); Bainbridge v. Bush, 148 F. Supp. 2d
1306, 1310 (M.D. Fla. 2001); Heald v. Engler, 00 Civ. 71438, slip. op. at 2-3 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 28,
2001).
9.

Sober as a Judge, Editorial, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 14, 2002, at A14.

10. The issues surrounding the Eleventh Amendment are very complex and this Note is not
intended to explain its complete history and jurisprudence. Many authors and commentators have
discussed the complexity of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. This Note looks at just a few cases
that provide examples of how the court has used the Eleventh Amendment to defend states' rights.
For a more complete history and discussion of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence see infra notes
282 & 291.
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to the "dignity" of the state and its recent history of upholding states'
rights.
Part VI concludes that states' prerogatives under the Twenty-First
Amendment should not overcome the Commerce Clause's purpose of
eliminating economic protectionism and encouraging a robust national
economy. Nevertheless, if the direct shipment of wine issue reaches the
Supreme Court, it is likely, in light of recent Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence, that the Court will protect the states' right to prohibit or
limit direct shipment of wine from out-of-state producers to the homes
of in-state consumers. While this decision would denigrate the negative
implication of the Commerce Clause prohibiting states from putting an
undue burden on interstate commerce, the Court may view the TwentyFirst Amendment as being preeminent in this situation because it
implicates the sovereignty of the states. Throughout United States
history, the law has treated alcohol differently from any other product,
with states having exclusive control over its regulation. 1 To diminish
that control could be viewed by the current Supreme Court majority as
diminishing the dignity and infringing on the sovereignty of the states.

II.

INTRODUCTION TO THE WINE WAR

Imagine taking a vacation in the Napa Valley, stopping at wineries,
taking tours, and then sampling the wines. You find yourself really
enjoying a bottle of wine and would like to ship some home and to
friends in different states. Yet, thanks to protectionist laws that preserve
the monopoly of wholesalers, it is against the law to ship wines or other
alcoholic beverages from out-of-state to homes in half the states in the
United States.
The last decade has seen a dramatic increase in interest in wine:
buying it, drinking it, and making it. 12 Underscoring Americans'

I l.See Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. 504, 539 (1847) (commonly known as the License
Cases). Massachusetts prohibited sales of liquor in quantities less than twenty-eight gallons and
required sellers to obtain licenses. See id. at 505. Chief Justice Taney opines that unless specifically
contradicted by congressional action, states may regulate interstate commerce in exerting their
police power for the general welfare of their citizens. See id. at 514-15. See also Background on
at
Laws,
Shipment
Anti-Direct
http://www.wineinstitute.org/shipwine/backgrounder/backgrounder.htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2003)
(describing that the common understanding of the Twenty-First Amendment is that it gives each
state the power to regulate alcoholic beverages within its boundaries unhampered by any federal
control).
12. See, e.g., Frank J. Prial, Caught Between Two Amendments, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2002, at
F II (describing the wine industry's growth from a cottage industry to a one billion dollar per year
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enthusiasm for wine is the tremendous growth in the last decade of the
twentieth century in the number of wineries in the United States.'1 3 There
are more than 2700 licensed wineries in the nation, representing a
ninety-three percent increase since 1990 when there were 1400
wineries. 14 Wineries are now a part of the rural farm economy in all fifty
states.' 5 Many of these wineries are family businesses operating on a
small scale. 16 Although California is the premier winegrowing state,
comprising roughly half the nation's wineries and over ninety percent of
the production, there are many wineries in Washington, Oregon, New
York, Ohio, Virginia, Pennsylvania, Texas, Missouri, Colorado, New
Mexico, Illinois, and Michigan.' 7 Each of these states has a minimum of
thirty wineries, with the top three having more than 150 apiece.18
As the number of wineries has increased, however, the number of
wholesalers has decreased from five thousand in 1950 to less than four
hundred today.' 9 Following Prohibition, state legislatures instituted a
three-tier system to keep control over the sale, distribution, and
consumption of all alcoholic beverages. 20 The primary purpose of the
system was to keep the liquor industry out of the hands of organized
criminals who had controlled liquor empires during Prohibition.2' Under
the three-tier system, all liquor must go from producer to
distributor/wholesaler to retailer, with each tier being regulated
individually and no owner investing in more than one tier. 22
The result of the three-tier system is that a relatively small number
of wholesalers now determine what wines are available to consumers.2 3
Wholesalers have generally been unwilling to represent smaller wineries
with limited production capacity-preferring to stick with national

enterprise); Alan J. Wax, Hearty Appetitefor Grapes,NEWSDAY (Nassau), July 12, 1999, at C8, C9
(acknowledging tremendous increase in prices for land with vineyard potential).
13. See Government Obstacles to E-Commerce: Hearing Before the Comm. on House Energy
and Commerce Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot., 107th Cong. (2002),
available at 2002 WL 100237686 [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of David P. Sloane, President,
Am. Vintners Ass'n).
14. See id
15.
16.
17.

See id
See id.
See id.

18. See id
19. See id.
20. See Alix M. Freedman & John R. Emshwiller, Vintage System: Big Liquor Wholesaler
Finds Change Stalking Its Very Private World, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1999, at A 1.
21. See id
22. See id
23. See Hearings, supra note 13.
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brands that generate greater sales volume.24 Fewer than seventeen
percent of wineries are represented by distributors. 25 Each year, wineries
in the United States produce many more wines than those represented by
wholesalers or sold in retail stores.26 Consumers who are wine
aficionados want to buy those unusual, hard-to-get wines and, based on
the wide availability of all kinds of other products, theirs is a reasonable
expectation that
they should be able to do so. 27 Under current conditions,
28
many cannot.

The Internet is an ideal medium for small wineries to showcase
their wine. 29 The Internet is also ideal for wine consumers to purchase
wines unavailable in their home states.30 However, in many states, state
statutes keep consumers from ordering wine over the Internet and
wineries from shipping their product in response.31 In some states, such
as Florida and Maryland, selling or ordering wine from out-of-state over
the Internet is a felony, with punishments equal to those handed out to
violent criminals.3 2
Wine consumers and wine makers are waging a war in state
legislatures and federal courts to overturn these prohibitive direct
shipment laws.3 3 After years of building momentum to convince courts
and legislatures to eliminate state shipping bans, consumers and wineries
have finally made some headway. 4 However, the powerful wholesaler

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See id.
See K. Lloyd Billingsley, Ship the Wine in Its Time, PAC. RES. INST., at 1 (Aug. 2002).
See id.
See id
See id.
See Dana Nigro, Tide Turns in Direct Shipping Battle, WINE SPECTATOR, Oct. 21, 2002,
at
53-54,
available
at
http://www.winespectator.com/Wine/Main/FeatureBasicTemplate/0, 1197,1501,00.html
[hereinafter Nigro, Direct Shipping Battle]; see also David Post & Bradford C. Brown, On the
Horizon:
The
Internet
and
the
21 s'
Amendment,
at
http://www.informationweek.com/story/IWK20021122S0020, Nov. 25, 2002 (describing how the
"Internet can do what distributors and wholesalers can't-provide access to all wineries large and
small across all geographic boundaries.").
30. See, e.g., Caroline E. Mayer, Stopped at the State Line; Cabernet-and-ContactsCoalition
Challenges Curbs on E-Commerce, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2002, at El (describing a Washington
D.C. wine lovers' frustration when trying to order wine over the Internet and how state regulations
limit the amount of wine he can receive from out-of-state wineries); see also Tony Mauro, Interstate
Wine Sales Start to Flow, USA TODAY, Dec. 15, 2002, at A 15 (noting that internet sites like eBay
do not auction wines and that most wine websites that wanted to become virtual wine shops have
collapsed partly because of the complex laws that govern interstate shipping).
31. See generally Mayer, supranote 30, at El; Mauro, supranote 30, at A 15.
32. See Billingsley, supranote 25, at 1-2.
33. See Nigro, Direct Shipping Battle,supra note 29, at 49.
34. See infra Part Ill for a discussion of the status of direct shipment cases.
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lobby has used its political and financial
muscle to protect its lucrative,
35
market.
monopolistic
virtually
and
A.

The Playersin the Wine War

The participants in the legal battles are: on one side, owners of
small wineries who want to ship wine directly to the homes of
consumers throughout the country, and consumers who do not have
many of those limited-production wines available at their local stores;
and on the other side, wholesalers who control the distribution of most
alcoholic beverages in this country, and state governments that are
concerned with collecting taxes on alcoholic beverages and preventing
underage drinking.36
1. The Winery Owners and the Consumers
Owners of small wineries want people in every state to have access
to their wine, and wine consumers want to order their favorite wines
from small wine boutique operations wherever they are located.3 7
However, twenty-six states expressly prohibit the direct shipment of
wine from out-of-state to consumers; eleven states significantly limit
direct shipment; and thirteen states have "reciprocal" shipping laws,
meaning that consumers can have wine sent to their homes directly from
wineries as long as the seller's home state allows out-of-state companies
to ship wine to its residents.38 One owner of a winery in Virginia
estimates that she loses about twenty percent of her business in sales
each year because she cannot ship to out-of-state customers. 39 Some
small wineries claim that they cannot find or afford wholesale
representation in many states, so they get locked out of those markets
40
entirely.
A wine connoisseur was shocked to receive a "very dramatic" letter
from the Maryland comptroller's office threatening him with criminal
prosecution and confiscation of his wines after he joined a wine-of-the

35. See infra Part ll.A.
36. See Katy McLaughlin, Merlot by Mail: Ordering Wine Online Gets Easier, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 21,2002, at Dl.
37. See Clint Bolick, Wine Wars: Lift the Ban on Out-of-State Sales, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7,
2000, at A39.
38. See infra Part II.C. for a more in-depth discussion of the states' shipping laws.
39. See Nigro, Direct Shipping Battle, supra note 29, at 53.
40. See id. at 53-54.
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month club and received wine from an out-of-state winery. 4' Countless
wine drinkers visit wineries and are introduced to new wines they like,
but can't buy in their home state.42 Another consumer in Montana
wanted to make sure that he did everything legally to have wine directly
shipped from a California winery.43 Montana regulators said he had to
buy a special state permit-a "connoisseur's license"-for fifty dollars
to have wine shipped directly to his home." The state also required him
to keep track of every purchase, give paperwork to regulators, and send
semiannual tax filings to the state.45 In the end, it was such a hassle that
he gave up and decided that it was easier to drive to the Napa Valley.46
It is not only vineyard owners who are losing customers, but
farmers who have added grapes to their repertoire to avoid the dire
consequences to more traditional crops during arid growing seasons.4
Growing grapes has become a way for some farmers to hedge their
bets-grapes flourish when other, more water-dependent crops die. 48 It
is interesting that while state Alcohol Beverage Control (ABC) agencies
have been fighting to preserve prohibitions on wine shipments, state
agriculture departments have been fighting to eliminate them.4 9
2. The Wholesalers
Alcoholic beverage wholesaling is big business, and it is clear that
powerful liquor wholesalers want to retain their monopoly or nearmonopoly advantage. One wholesaler based in Miami, Southern Wine
and Spirits, generates annual revenues of $2.3 billion. 5' Other
wholesalers who wish to block direct shipment include Peerless
Importers Inc., Charmer Industries, Inc., Eber Bros. Wine & Liquor
Corp., and Premier Beverage Company LLC.52 While the current system
41. See id at 49. After receiving the threatening letter from the state of Maryland, he not only
stopped his wine-club orders, he scaled back what was a $4,500-a-year hobby, settling for the
limited selection available at his local Maryland stores. See id.
42.

See id

43. See Matt Gouras, Maze of State Laws Leaves Bitter Taste With Wine-Lovers, PITT. POSTGAZETTE, Nov. 27, 2002, at C11.
44. See id
45. See id
46. See id
47. See Janet Elliott, Bills Would Let Texans Buy Wine Over the Internet, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Apr. 1,2001, at 1.

48. See id.
49. See id See also, e.g., Laylan Copelin, Will Texas Allow Wine Shipments? Stay Tuned,
AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Feb. 20, 2001, at B 1.

50. See Billingsley, supranote 25, at 4.
51. See id
52.

See id
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is obviously advantageous to wholesalers, the benefits do not trickle
down to consumers. 53 Consumers' ability to purchase is limited by what
wholesalers stock, and many
wholesalers do not carry the wines
54
produced by small wineries.
The median production of the 2700 licensed wineries in the United
States is approximately 3500 cases of wine per year.15 The larger
California wineries may typically make three hundred thousand cases a
year or more. A mid-size winery makes about fifty thousand cases a
year.5 6 A small boutique winery, or "family-farm" type winery, might
make only one or two thousand cases a year. 7 The vast majority of all
United States wineries are small, often family-owned businesses. 58 The
annual U.S. production exceeds two hundred million cases with the top
one hundred wineries, only six percent of all U.S. wineries, producing
ninety-five percent of that total. 59 The explosion in the number of small
wineries coupled with the tremendous consolidation amongst
wholesalers, has locked out hundreds of wineries and their customers
from conducting business in many markets.6 °
Consumers also pay higher prices due to the considerable mark-up
by wholesalers, roughly eighteen to twenty-five percent more per
bottle.6' In other industries, businesspeople strive to eliminate the middle
distribution level to increase efficiency and profitability. 62 In the wine
industry, however, eliminating the middle man can be a criminal
offense.

63

The Wine and Spirit Wholesalers of America, an industry
association of alcoholic beverage wholesalers, argues that its members
support the bans on direct shipment, not to protect their own economic

53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See Alcohol Sales Between State Via Internet: Interstate Alcohol Sales and the 21st
Amendment: Hearings Before Senate Judiciary Comm., 106th Cong. (1999) [hereinafter Interstate
Hearings] (statement of Michael Ballard, President, Savannah-Chanel Vineyards), availiable at
1999 WL 8085411.
56. See Susan Lorde Martin, Changing the Law: Update from the Wine War, 17 J.L. & POL.
63, 68 (2001).
57. See id. at 68-69.
58. See Interstate Hearings, supra note 55.
59. See id.
60. See id
61. See Billingsley, supra note 25, at 4.
62. See id.
63. See id.
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interests, but to perform important state functions such as encouraging
social responsibility in alcohol sales.64
3. State Governments
Rather than acknowledging simple economic protectionism, which
is a Commerce Clause violation, prohibitionist states cast their support
for prohibitive laws in moral and fiscal terms. 65 The moral argument
against wine sales over the Internet is that such an arrangement would
promote drinking by minors. 66 The main fiscal argument is that alcoholic
beverages generate much revenue for states, and officials fear that
consumers will purchase all their wine and spirits online, depriving the
state of lucrative taxes.67

State legislatures and the wholesalers have aligned themselves with
those trying to discourage underage drinking and underage access to
alcohol.6 8 They conclude that prohibiting direct shipment of wine is an
important method of protecting the nation's young people. 69 They cite
the large number of high school students who have access to the
Internet, and the significant number of students who report that they
have engaged in binge drinking. 70 However, one study has shown that
approximately sixty-seven percent of high school seniors who say they
drink alcohol also say they can buy it locally, and the study concluded
that if it is so easy to get alcohol in the neighborhood, young people are
not going to wait to have it shipped from out-of-state. 71 Furthermore,
California and New York, the two states with the highest wine
consumption, have for many years permitted shipments of alcoholic
beverages within their states, as have twenty-eight other states. 72 If
keeping children from ordering alcoholic beverages online is the true
reason for prohibiting direct shipment of wine, it certainly does not make

64. See Nigro, Direct Shipping Battle, supra note 29, at 50.
65. See Billingsley, supranote 25, at 5.
66. See id.
67. See Prial, supra note 12. State taxes on alcoholic products are estimated at nearly ten
billion dollars per year. See id.
68. See Interstate Hearings, supra note 55, (statement of Rep. Juanita Millender-McDonald
describing a New York television program showing an underage person ordering alcohol from a
direct shipper in California and accepting delivery from a commercial freight carrier).
69. See id
70. See id
71. See Direct Shipping of Wine: FosteringConsumer Choice and FairCompetition: Hearing
Before the U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of Hon. Mike
Thompson), available at 1999 WL 130100.
72. See 145 CONG. REC. H6856-02, H6864 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1999) (statement of Rep.
Radanovich).
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sense that a child living on Long Island in New York can order wine
online from Rochester, New York, but cannot order wine from New
Jersey.
State governments have an interest in direct shipment of alcoholic
beverages apart from general law enforcement and protection of minors:
tax revenue.73 One estimate has it that in 1998 states lost six hundred
million dollars in revenue because of illegal alcohol shipments.74 The
National Conference of State Liquor Administrators has estimated that
direct shipment of all kinds of liquor, primarily wine and beer, amounts
to three hundred million dollars annually, resulting in losses of state tax
revenues in the tens of millions.7 5
The argument that removing the ban on direct shipment of wine
76
would encourage the avoidance of taxes on wine is a mere pretext.
Collecting taxes on shipments of wine directly to consumers is not a
problem that is specific to wine.77 It is the same problem states have had
with all Internet sales and with mail-order catalogue sales. 78 The
emergence of the Internet as a vehicle for retail sales has generated much
interest in the collection of state sales taxes. 79 Many journalists and
academics have written articles concerning this issue.80 One study has
estimated that in 2003 the total amount of sales and use taxes due on ecommerce transactions but uncollected will be over twenty billion
dollars, from a low of about thirty-two million dollars in Vermont to a
high of about three billion dollars in California.8 ' Thus, it is
unreasonable for proponents of collecting taxes on e-commerce
transactions to isolate the direct shipment of wine as causing a particular
73. See InterstateHearings, supranote 55 (statement of Sen. Hatch).
74. See 145 CONG. REC. H6856-02, H68588 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1999) (statement of Rep.

Delahunt).
75. See Dep't of Treas., Bur. ATF, Industry Circular 96-3
http://www.atf.treas.gov/pub/ind-circulars/ic_96-3.htm.
76.

(Feb.

11,

1997)

at

One Dallas wine collector said direct shipments are not a way to save money and that he

would be "'be more than happy to pay the sales tax."' See Nigro, supra note 30. Direct Shipping
Battle, supra note 29, at 53-54.

77. See Martin, supranote 56, at 94.
78. See id.
79. See id.

80. See generally, George B. Delta, State Taxation of the Internet; A Review of Some Issues, 7
WILLAMETTE J. INT'L & DisP. RESOL. 136 (2000); Steven J. Forte, Use Tax Collection on Internet
Purchases:Should the Mail OrderIndustry Serve as a Model? 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER INFO.

L. 203 (1997); Richard Wolf, Status of Use Tax Likely to Rise; Levy Could Make up for Lost
Revenue, USA TODAY, Apr. I1, 2000, at 4A.
81. See Statement of the Federationof Tax Admins. Before the Subcomm. on Commercial &
Admin. Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2000) (statement of Gary Viken,
Vice President, Federation of Tax Admins.), available at 2000 WL 959673.
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tax collection problem for states. Directly shipped wine would be just a
small fraction of all wine purchases and a mere fraction of all directly
shipped goods in total.82 Many states are finally making an attempt to
solve the problem of collecting these taxes by making it easier for ecommerce retailers to collect. 83 It is clear that wineries selling directly to
consumers should have to collect state taxes, and consumers shopping
that way should not be able to avoid taxes. Small wineries should be able
to sell their wines, and consumers should be able to buy from them, but
neither should have a tax advantage over retail stores. That, however, is
the same argument that applies to Amazon.com, Dell.com, or
JCrew.com-the wine industry should not be singled out. The
"avoidance of tax" argument used by supporters of a ban on the direct
shipment of wine is a red herring that should be discounted by presiding
courts.
B.

The Legal Battle: Direct Shipment, the Commerce Clause, and the
Twenty-First Amendment

Underlying the direct shipment legal battle is the tension between
the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution and the TwentyFirst Amendment to the Constitution, which grants to the states the
power to regulate the importation and distribution of alcoholic beverages
within their borders.8 4 The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power
"[t]o regulate Commerce... among the several States. 85 Although the
clause speaks specifically only to the powers of Congress, it is well
settled that there is a "dormant" aspect to the Commerce Clause that
prohibits states, while exercising their police power, from putting an
86
undue burden on interstate commerce through economic protectionism.
This "negative implication" of the Commerce Clause prohibits economic
protectionism through regulatory measures designed to benefit
in-state
87
economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.
To determine whether state statutes violate the dormant Commerce
Clause, the Supreme Court has used a two-tier analysis. 88 If the statute
82. See Martin, supra note 56, at 96.
83. See infra notes 205-06.
84. See Swedenburg v. Kelly, 232 F. Supp. 2d 135, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also Prial, supra
note 12.
85. U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8, cl.
3.
86. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 579-80 (1995); Dennis v. Higgins, 498
U.S. 439, 447 (1991); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579
(1986).
87. See New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1988).
88. See Brown-FormanDistillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 578-79.
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"directly regulates or discriminates against interstate commerce, or when
its effect is to favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state
interests, [the Court] ha[s] generally struck down the statute without
further inquiry. 89 Only if such a regulation is shown to "advance[] a
legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable
non-discriminatory alternatives" will it be upheld. 90 When, however, a
statute has only incidental effects on interstate commerce and regulates
evenhandedly, the Court has examined whether the State's interest is
legitimate and whether the burden on interstate commerce exceeds the
local benefits. 9' Although the two tiers of analysis are not clearly
distinguishable, "[i]n either situation, the critical consideration
is the
92
activity."
interstate
and
local
both
on
statute
the
of
effect
overall
The primary basis for the direct shipment lawsuits is the plaintiffs'
assertion that the statutes prohibiting the direct shipment of wine by outof-state producers into the state are unconstitutional because they violate
the negative implication of the Commerce Clause. 93 The position of the
plaintiffs probably seems intuitively correct to most consumers because
they are so used to ordering every kind of product on the phone or online
from sellers all over the country. A basic understanding of the
Commerce Clause would seem to suggest that states could not prohibit
an out-of-state producer from sending a legal product into the state,
particularly when in-state producers are allowed to ship directly to
consumers' homes. Nevertheless, the defendants defend the right of
states to regulate alcoholic beverages on two fronts. First, the defendants
contend that even if the direct shipping ban on wine were found to be
discriminatory, it is justified "both in terms of the local benefits flowing
from the statute and the unavailability of non-discriminatory alternatives
adequate to preserve the local interests at stake. 94 Those benefits are
limiting underage drinking and collecting taxes. Second, the defendants
contend that Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment confers rights
that trump the Commerce Clause.95 Section 2 says: "The transportation
or importation into any state, territory, or possession of the United States
89.

Id. at 579.

90. New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 278.
91. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 579.

92. Id.
93. See Hearings, supra note 13, (statement of David P. Sloane, President, Am. Vintners
Ass'n).
94. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
95. See, e.g., Swedenburg v. Kelly, 232 F. Supp. 2d 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); see also
Mauro, supra note 30 (describing the wholesalers' argument that alcohol is the sole product that has

its own constitutional provision-a reflection of the unique history of alcohol in this country).
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for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws
thereof, is hereby prohibited., 96 What Congress intended in this section
is not entirely clear.97 The wholesalers argue that Section 2 of the
Twenty-First Amendment gives each state the power to regulate
alcoholic beverages within its boundaries unhampered by any federal
control. 98 Court decisions rendered shortly after the enactment of the
Amendment contributed to that belief.99
However, the United States Supreme Court has indicated in recent
cases that the Twenty-First Amendment does not give the states
unfettered power to regulate alcoholic beverages within their boundaries;
that state liquor regulation is not completely free of compliance with
other federal rules and constitutional mandates. 100 The Court has said
96. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1.
97. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 516 (1996) (stating that the
Twenty-First Amendment is treated as though it permits states to enact some laws banning the
importation of alcoholic beverages even though such laws might, without the Twenty-First
Amendment, violate the dormant Commerce Clause). But see Healy v. Beer Inst. 491 U.S. 324, 34143 (1989) (holding that the Twenty-First Amendment falls short of giving states free rein in
regulating the importation of alcoholic beverages). In discussing the confusion surrounding section
2 of the Twenty-First Amendment, Laurence Tribe, a constitutional law scholar wrote:
Section 2 of the Twenty-[F]irst Amendment directly prohibits-talk about
prohibition!!-the conduct that it was apparently meant to authorize the States to
prohibit, freeing them of some (but not all) otherwise applicable limits derived from the
rest of the Constitution. As a result, not only does the Amendment do more than its
purpose required, it also does less. That is, it fails to specify that the States are authorized
by it to do anything at all; that conclusion is evidently thought to follow by some sort of
logical necessity. And just what it is they are authorized to do-to prohibit importation
of liquor, yes; to use their liquor authority to distort the national liquor market, no-is
left largely to the constitutional imagination. Moreover, the two statutes enforcing the
Twenty-First Amendment necessarily rest for their underlying authority not on anything
added to the Constitution by the Twenty-first Amendment but on the good old
Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8.
Laurence H. Tribe, How to Violate the Constitution Without Really Trying: Lessons from the Repeal
of Prohibition to the Balanced Budget Amendment, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 217, 219-20 (1995)
(footnotes omitted).
at
Shipment
Laws,
on
Anti-Direct
98. See,
e.g.,
Background
http://www.wineinstitute.org/shipwine/backgrounder/backgrounder.htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2003).
99. See, e.g., State Bd. of Equalization v. Young's Mkt. Co., 299 U.S. 59, 62 (1936) (holding
that a California license fee for importing beer into the state did not violate the Commerce Clause);
Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 305 U.S. 391, 394 (1930) (holding that a
Michigan statute prohibiting dealers from selling beer made in a state that discriminates against
Michigan beer did not violate the Commerce Clause).
100. See 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 484 (holding that Rhode Island's ban on price
advertising for liquor violated the First Amendment's free speech protection, a protection that is not
qualified by the Twenty-First Amendment); Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1112 (1 1th Cir.
2002) (holding that the Twenty-First Amendment alters the dormant Commerce Clause in a way
that "provides states some added insulation from an otherwise valid attack, but falls short of full
immunization").
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specifically that "the Twenty-First Amendment did not entirely remove
0°
state regulation of alcohol from the reach of the Commerce Clause."' '
Nevertheless, "not completely free" and "did not entirely remove" leave
a great deal of room for the current Court to conclude that a state's
freedom in this area is very close to complete.
C. State Direct Shipment Laws
This country, settled by Puritans who denounced drinking as a sin,
then populated by immigrants who viewed wine, beer or spirits as an
integral part of their culture, has seen attitudes on drinking swing back
and forth over the centuries. 10 2 The temperance movement led to the
ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment banning the manufacture and
sale of alcoholic beverages throughout the nation and it set in motion a
chain of events that has led to today's complex system of alcohol
03
regulations.1
In order to repeal Prohibition in 1933, Congress had to promise
states the means to encourage temperance, allow counties and towns to
remain "dry," keep out organized crime, and prevent the monopolistic
practices of the past in which brewer-and distiller-owned retail
outlets encouraged abusive consumption habits.' 0 4 The Twenty-First
Amendment gave the states broad power to regulate the sale, distribution
and importation of alcoholic beverages within and across their
borders. 105
The different state alcohol laws came into effect after Prohibition
when State legislatures enacted prohibitive wine shipment statutes and
instituted a three-tier system. 10 6 State legislatures concluded that by
prohibiting "tied-house" arrangements, large alcoholic beverage
businesses would not be able to dominate local markets through vertical
and horizontal integration, or by using excessive marketing
techniques.10 7 The legislatures assumed that consumption of alcohol

101. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 584 (1986); see
also Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 275 (1984); Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage
Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 332 (1964) (holding that the Twenty-First Amendment and the
Commerce Clause "each must be considered in light of the other").
102. See Nigro, supranote 29, at 50.
103. See id.
104.

See id.

105. See id.
106. See Billingsley, supra note 25, at 5; Prial, supranote 12.
107. See California Beer Wholesalers Ass'n. v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 487
P.2d 745, 748 (Cal. 1971).
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1°8
would decline absent aggressive marketing and price-cutting.
Therefore, the three-tier system would promote orderly markets and
temperance. 0 9 States have dealt with the potential breakdown.of the
system when out-of-state producers send wine directly to consumers in a
variety of statutory ways.
As one commentator has written, "[W]hen it comes to buying
wine,... Americans may as well live in [fifty] different countriessome relatively free and open, some so closed they resemble old-style
dictatorships."' 10 Today you can go online to buy books, artwork,
computers, clothes, music, and medical prescriptions and have them
shipped directly to your home, yet in twenty-six states it is illegal for an
out-of-state winery to ship a bottle of wine to a consumer's address."I1 2
Direct-to-consumer wine shipments are prohibited in Alabama, 1 7
14
Kansas, 15 Maine,' 16 Massachusetts,
Arkansas, 113 Delaware,'
121 Ohio, 122
19
New Jersey, 120 New York,
Michigan,' 18 Mississippi,'
127
1
26
1
25
124
Oklahoma,' 23 South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont,

108. See id. at 748, 748 n.7.
109. See Swedenburg v. Kelly, 232 F. Supp. 2d 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
110. Dana Nigro, Crossing State Lines, WINE SPECTATOR, Oct. 15, 2002, at 60, available at
http://www.winespectator.com/Wine/Main/FeatureBasicTemplate/0, 1197,1059,00.html.
11. See
The
Wine
Institute,
State-by-State
Analysis,
at
http://www.wineinstitute.org/shipwine/analysis/stateanalysis.htm (citing the direct shipment laws
of the fifty states) (last visited Aug. 20, 2003); Nigro, supra note 29, at 49.
112. See ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 20-X-8.03 (2002) (prohibiting consumers from ordering wine
from out-of-state wineries unless they obtain permission from the liquor authority and have wine
sent to an ABC store for pickup and payment of taxes).
113. See ARK. CODE ANN. §3-7-106(a)(1) (Michie 2002) (prohibiting consumers from
shipping wine into Arkansas without permission from a liquor authority).
114. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 501(c) (2002) (prohibiting direct shipment except for special
orders of up to five cases per year allowed for wines not readily available in state).
115. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 41-306 (2001) (prohibiting direct shipment).
116. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. § 28-A, § 2077-B (West 2002) (prohibiting a person from
selling, furnishing, delivering or purchasing liquor from an out-of-state company by mail order).
117. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 138, §§ 1, 2 (West 2002) (prohibiting consumers from
shipping wine into Massachusetts without following the provisions of this chapter).
118. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 436.1203 (West 2002) (prohibiting direct shipment but
allowing personal transportation of up to nine quarts from out-of-state).
119. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-31-47 (2002) (prohibiting direct shipment).
120. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-2 (West 2002) (prohibiting direct shipment but allowing
personal transportation from out-of-state).
121. See N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 102(1)(c) (McKinney 2000) (prohibiting consumers
from shipping wine into New York without permission from a liquor authority).
122. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4301.20 (West 2002) (prohibiting direct shipment but
allowing personal transportation from out-of-state, as long as not more than one liter of liquor in any
thirty-day period).
123. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37 § 505 (West 2002) (prohibiting direct shipment except for
person entering state in possession of liquor as long as Oklahoma excise tax has been paid).
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and Virginia. 128 In New York, for example, currently no alcoholic
beverages may be shipped into the state from anywhere in the United
129
In Florida, 130
States unless they are being sent to a licensed seller.
Indiana, 13 1 Kentucky,132 Maryland, 133 North Carolina, 34 and
Tennessee, 35 direct shipment is a felony. Many wineries will not risk
shipping to out-of-state sellers and consumers because if they are
36
convicted of a felony, they can lose their federal permit to make wine.
In Indiana 137 and North Carolina, 38 it is a felony for those without
permits to ship wine directly, and a misdemeanor for wineries. Even
those who have purchased wine out-of-state and attempt to ship it to
themselves can be charged in some cases, and in some cases a bottle of
124. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-21-1610 (Law. Co-op 2002) (prohibiting direct shipment except
for persons importing up to ten cases of alcohol for personal use, upon payment of taxes).
125. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 35-4-66 (Michie 2002) (prohibiting direct shipment except for
individual transporting into the state one gallon or less of alcoholic beverages).
126. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-12-503 (2002) (prohibiting direct shipment).
127. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7 § 63(b) (2002) (prohibiting direct shipment except for personal
transportation of up to six gallons from out-of-state with a permit).
128. See VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-310 (Michie 2002) (prohibiting direct shipment except for
personal transportation of up to four liters from out-of-state). A U.S. District Court has overturned
this ban, but an appeal is pending. See Bolick v. Roberts, 199 F. Supp. 2d 397, 451 (E.D. Va. 2002),
discussed infra Part 111(5). On February 5, 2003, the Virginia General Assembly passed measures
that would allow the direct shipment of wine in and out of the state. See Steven Ginsberg,
Lawmakers Pass Bills on Va. Wine Shipment; Direct Delivery Sought In and Out-of-state, WASH.
POST., Feb. 6, 2003, at B I. The final version of the bill needs to be agreed upon by both state houses
before the final bill is forwarded to the governor. See id. The legislation would permit the delivery
of up to twenty-four bottles a month of out-of-state wine and would allow Virginia vintners to ship
directly to consumers in the thirteen states with similar provisions. See id.
129. In a recent decision, however, the Southern District Court of New York held that the ban
was unconstitutional. An appeal is pending. See Swedenburg v. Kelly, 232 F. Supp. 2d 135, 152
(S.D.N.Y. 2002), discussed infra Part 111(4).
130. See FLA. STAT. ANN. 561.545 (West 2002) (authorizing imprisonment for a violation of
direct shipment prohibition).
131. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 7.1-5-1-9.5, 7.1-5-11-1.5 (West 2002) (authorizing imprisonment
for retailers and brewers which do not hold a federal basic permit as wineries do).
132. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 244.165 (Banks-Baldwin 2002) (authorizing imprisonment
for a violation of direct shipment prohibition).
133. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 16-506.1 (2002) (authorizing imprisonment of up to two
years and $ 1,000 fine).
134. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-102.1 (2002) (authorized imprisonment for retailers and
breweries that do not hold a federal basic permit). In a recent decision, however, a U.S. District
Court held that North Carolina's ban on direct shipment of wine was unconstitutional. An appeal is
pending. See Beskind v. Easley, 197 F. Supp. 2d 464, 475 (W.D.N.C. 2002), discussed infra Part
111(6).
135. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-3-401 (2002) (authorizing imprisonment for a violation of
direct shipment prohibition).
136. See Nigro, Crossing State Lines supranote 11, at 60.
137. See IND. CODE ANN. § 7:1-5.1-9.5(b).
138. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B-102.1(e).
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39
wine in luggage can be considered direct shipment.'
There are twelve states that allow consumers to bring in out-of-state
wine under certain conditions, typically requiring the seller or consumer
to register with the state or pay for a special shipping permit. 140 These
states also generally restrict the amount of wine that a resident can bring
in annually and require the winery and consumer to pay taxes and report
require special
the transactions. 4 1 States that allow limited43shipping and
1
Georgia, 144 Louisiana, 145
permits include Alaska, t42 Connecticut,
Montana, 146 Nebraska, 147 Nevada, 148 New Hampshire, 149 North
Dakota, 150 Rhode Island, 151 Wyoming, 152 and the District of
Columbia.' 53 Arizona,154 Maryland,' 55 and Pennsylvania' 56 are "special-

139. See Nigro, Crossing State Lines, supra note I 11,at 60.
140. See id. at 61.
141. See id,
The statutes usually speak in terms of limiting liters and gallons. One case equals
nine liters, or twelve 750ml bottles. Two cases equals about five gallons. See id at 62.
142. See Op. Att'y Gen. 1979 WL 22964 (Alaska A.G. 1979) (limiting direct shipment subject
to the Attorney General's discretion).
143. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-436 (West 2002) (limiting direct shipment but allowing
consumers to get permits to ship or personally carry in up to four gallons at one time or five gallons
within a sixty-day period).
144. See GA. CODE ANN. § 3-6-32 (2002) (limiting direct shipment to no more than five cases
of wine a year to a consumer who has purchased the wine while on the premises of the winery).
145. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 359 (West 2002) (limiting direct shipment to no more than
four cases per year from retailers and wineries that do not have a distributor in the state).
146. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 16-4-901 (2001) (limiting direct shipment to no more than
twelve cases per year from out-of-state wineries, after obtaining a fifty dollar license).
147. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 53-194.03 (2002) (limiting direct shipment to no more than nine
liters per month from out-of-state wineries).
148. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 369.490 (Michie 2002) (limiting direct shipment to no more
than twelve cases per year from out-of-state wineries).
149. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 178:14-a (2002) (limiting direct shipment to no more than
five cases per year to any individual consumer and a total of one hundred cases per year in the
state).
150. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-16 (2001) (limiting direct shipment to no more than nine
liters per month from out-of-state wineries).
151. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-4-1 (2002) (limiting direct shipment to on-premises purchases at
wineries only).
152. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-204 (Michie 2002) (limiting direct shipment to no more
than two cases per year).
153. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 25-102 (2002) (limiting direct shipment subject to obtaining an
importation permit).
154. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 4-203.04 (2002) (limiting direct shipment but allows special
orders through the three-tier system).
155. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 16-506.1 (2002) (limiting direct shipment to only those
holding the requisite license).
156. See 40 PA. CODE §§ 9.41, 9.115 (2002) (limiting direct shipment to only those holding the
requisite license but providing exception for gifts of liquor which may be imported into the state).
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order" states under the three-tier system.157 "Special order" state systems
58
allow consumers to buy wines that are not distributed in the state.1
After the order is placed, the wine must be sent through a wholesaler to a
retailer for a pickup, where
the consumer will be charged state taxes and
59
additional handling fees. 1

Reciprocity states have another category of state direct shipment
laws.160 In such states, direct shipment is allowed from another state that
accords the same privilege.' 16 These shipments must be to persons of
legal age and are only for personal use, not resale. 62 For example, if you
live in Illinois, you can order directly from a California winery because
both states allow reciprocal shipping, but you cannot order from a New
York winery because New York State has no such law. 163 The
thirteen
167
166
64
Colorado, 65 Hawaii,
reciprocity states are: California,
17
169
New
Minnesota, 170 Missouri,'
Illinois, 168 Iowa,

Oregon,173

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Washington,174

'

West

Virginia,175

and

Idaho,
Mexico, 172

Wisconsin.1 76

See Nigro, supra note 11l,
at 61.
See id
See id
See id.
See id
See id
See id.
See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 23661.2 (West 2002) (reciprocity state allowing out-of-

state wineries
165. See
state wineries
166. See

to ship wine into the state).
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-47-104 (West 2002) (reciprocity state allowing out-ofto ship wine into the state).
2002 Haw. Sess. Laws 281-33.5 (reciprocity state allowing out-of-state wineries to

ship two cases of wine per year after registering with the individual island commissions).
167. See IDAHO CODE § 23-1309A (Michie 2002) (reciprocity state allowing out-of-state
wineries to ship wine into the state).
168. See 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/6-29 (West 2002) (reciprocity state allowing out-ofstate wineries to ship wine into the state).
169. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.187 (West 2001) (reciprocity state allowing out-of-state
wineries to ship wine into the state).
170. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340A.417 (West 2002) (reciprocity state allowing out-of-state
wineries to ship wine into the state).
171. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 311.462 (West 2002) (reciprocity state allowing out-of-state
wineries to ship wine into the state).
172. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 60-7A-3(E) (Michie 2002) (reciprocity state allowing out-of-state
wineries to ship wine into the state).
173. See OR. REV. STAT. § 471.229 (2001) (reciprocity state allowing out-of-state wineries to
ship wine into the state).
174. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 66.12.190, (West 2002) (reciprocity state allowing out-ofstate wineries to ship wine into the state).
175. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 60-8-6 (Michie 2002) (reciprocity state allowing out-of-state
wineries to ship wine into the state).
176. See WIS. STAT. §§ 125.58, 125.68 (West 2001) (reciprocity state allowing out-of-state
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Reciprocal laws do not mean unlimited shipping; some states place
stricter limits than others on how many cases can be delivered. 77 For
example, in Idaho up to two cases per month from wineries and retailers
may be directly shipped, while in Illinois only up to178two cases per year
from wineries and retailers may be directly shipped.
D. Recent FederalActions
Congress is also getting involved in the direct shipment issue. In
October, 2002, Congress passed a measure that temporarily allows
winery visitors to ship wine back home to themselves, provided that the
laws in their state of residence permit them to carry alcohol purchases
personally across state lines. 179 The new provision, which is part of the
much larger Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act,
applies even to some states that currently ban interstate shipments from a
winery directly to the consumer. 180 The wine-shipping provision grew
out of the airline security precautions instituted after Sept. 11, 2001,
particularly the restrictions on the number, size, and type of carry-on
bags.' 8' Wineries became concerned that the carry-on restrictions would
cut into tasting-room sales. 8 2 The provision, which applies to wine only,
is effective during any period that the Federal Aviation Administration
places restrictions on airline passengers to ensure safety. 183 Consumers
must still adhere to the restrictions in their home state and an adult must
purchase the wine in person at the winery for personal use only. 8 4 The
wine business views this new provision as an important measure because
Congress was finally "'acknowledging the legitimacy of direct
shipments as85 a means of getting a product from wineries to
consumers."1
The Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") announced in July 2002
that antitrust regulators will be scrutinizing state laws to see if any are
unfairly restricting e-commerce in order to protect local businesses from
wineries to ship wine into the state).
177. See Nigro, supranote 111,at 61.
178. See id. at 62.
179. See Dana Nigro, Congress Passes Measure Temporarily Easing States' Wine-Shipping
Restrictions,
Oct.
4,
2002,
at
http://www.winespectator.com/Wine/Daily/News/0, 1145,1849,00.html.
180. See id
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See id.

185.

Id. (quoting David Sloane, President, American Vintners Association).
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86
the wine.
industries
the FTC plans to examine are
competition.1
87
automobile, real Among
estate, and

III.

THE WINE WAR AND THE LOWER COURTS

Since the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed state bans
on direct shipment of wine, the other federal courts in recent years have
grappled with the complex relationship between the dormant Commerce
Clause and the Twenty-First Amendment. There is little agreement on
what approach should be taken thus far. Court opinions vary but usually
depend upon (1) whether the judge interprets the Twenty-First
Amendment as providing nearly absolute power to the states, under
Section 2, to establish a comprehensive regulatory system to achieve
legitimate state interests in promoting temperance, raising revenue, and
insuring orderly market conditions, and views any inequitable results as
inconsequential burdens on commerce, or (2) whether the judge applies
a Commerce Clause balancing test and gives prominence to economic
discrimination resulting from a state's disparate application of88its
regulatory scheme to favor local wineries over out-of-state wineries.
Consumers and small wineries have gotten together to change the
laws in states that prohibit direct shipment. They have challenged state
statutes in eight states: Florida, Indiana, Michigan, New York, North
Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and Washington. 89 In New York, North
Carolina, Virginia, and Texas federal district courts have struck down
state restrictions on direct shipment of wine on dormant Commerce
Clause grounds, while in Michigan a federal district court upheld such
restrictions. 90 All these decisions currently are on appeal.' 9' The two
Circuit Courts to hear cases thus far have split their decisions, with the
Seventh Circuit holding that Indiana direct shipment laws are
constitutional and the Eleventh Circuit holding that Florida direct
shipment laws are unconstitutionally discriminatory. 192

186. See Nigro, supra note 29, at 49-50.
187. See id. at 50.
188. See Dickerson v. Bailey, 212 F. Supp. 2d 673, 678-79 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
189. See Hearings,supra note 13, (testimony of Ted Cruz, Director, Office of Policy Planning
Federal Trade Commission).
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. Compare Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2000), with Bainbridge
v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104 (11th Cir. 2002), discussed infra, Parts 111(1) & (3), respectively.
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1. Indiana
In Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson,193 consumers of alcoholic
beverages brought suit challenging an Indiana statute prohibiting direct
shipments of alcohol from out-of-state to Indiana consumers.' 9 4 The
United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana found
the statute unconstitutional. 195 Judge Easterbrook, for the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, reversed the lower court's decision,
reinstating the statute citing constitutional authorization under the
Twenty-First Amendment. 196 Judge Easterbrook noted that "[Section] 2
of the [T]wenty-[F]irst Amendment empowers Indiana to control alcohol
in ways that it cannot control cheese"' 197 and found that Section 2
"enables a state to do to importation of liquor ...what it chooses to do
to the internal sales of liquor, but nothing more."' 98 He acknowledged
that the Supreme Court has held that imports cannot be allowed on
discriminatory terms, but got around that problem in Indiana by
declaring 99
that there was no discrimination in Indiana against out-of-state
wineries.'
The court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that a provision of the
Indiana Code that allowed only holders of wine wholesaler or retailer
permits to ship wine directly to Indiana consumers' homes was
discriminatory. 20 0 The court noted that permit holders could "deliver
California and Indiana wines alike; firms that do not hold permits may
not deliver wine from either (or any) source. '201 Thus, the court
concluded that there was no discrimination in Indiana. However, while
Easterbrook insisted that there was no discrimination against out-of-state
wineries because all alcoholic beverages had to pass through Indiana's
three-tier system, and, therefore all sellers were being treated equally, he
completely ignored the fact that many of the wines the plaintiffs wanted
to buy are made by very small wineries. There are no wholesalers that
are going to want to put the resources into efforts to sell and distribute
the thousands of wines made by such small wineries. 2 The Indiana
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

227 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 2000).
See id. at 849.
See id. at 854.
See id
Id.at 851.
Id. at 853.
See id. at 853-84.
See id. at 853.

201. Id.
202. See, e.g., Ted Appel, Less Whining about Wine; More States Moving to Ease or Eliminate
Rules that Prevent Consumers from Buying Wines Directlyfrom Vintners, PRESS DEMOCRAT, Mar.

4, 2001, at El.
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statute, thus, in effect, keeps these wines out of Indiana, giving an
advantage to Indiana wine retailers, wholesalers, and producers.
Judge Easterbrook's opinion suggests that he was determined to
find the Indiana statute constitutional because of his conviction that the
plaintiffs' only interest was in flouting Indiana law and avoiding taxes
on their wine purchases. 20 3 Although he noted Indiana's failure to
enforce its permit and tax laws,20 4 he did not seem to consider that there
are ways to enforce such laws without prohibiting out-of-state wineries
from shipping to Indiana consumers. 20 5 Many state legislatures are
currently considering just that issue. 206
The United States Supreme Court refused to hear the plaintiffs'
appeal of the Seventh Circuit decision.20 7 Interestingly, the Wine
Institute and the Coalition for Free Trade, both advocates of eliminating
direct shipment prohibitions, were pleased by the Court's refusal to hear
the Indiana case. 20 8 Because the Indiana lawsuit did not include any
wineries as plaintiffs, unlike similar cases filed later in other states, the
Coalition for Free Trade and Wine Institute felt the case was not the
strongest among those pending. 20 9 The advocacy groups believe that the
cases pending in six other states (Florida, Michigan, New York, North
Carolina, Texas and Virginia) face a better chance if they eventually
reach the Supreme Court because the plaintiffs are both consumers and
wineries. 210

203. See Bridenbaugh,227 F.3d. at 854.
204. See id at 850.
205. See States Pass Streamlined Sales Tax Agreement, Nov. 12, 2002, at
http://www.nga.org/nga/newsRoom/I 1169,C_PRESSRELEASE%5eD_4632,00,00.html
(describing how the Streamlined Sales Tax Agreement, if enacted by ten state legislatures, would
establish uniform definitions for taxable goods and would require participating states and local
governments to have only one statewide tax rate for each type of product effective 2006); see also
supra text accompanying notes 77-82.
206. See STREAMLINED SALES TAX PROJECT, LIST OF PARTICIPATING STATES (as of Mar. 27,
2003), at http://www.nga.org/cda/images/USAMap.gif (last visited Aug. 20, 2003) (listing thirtyeight states that have adopted legislation, one state where legislation has been introduced and is
pending approval, three states that are observers, five states that have no sales tax, and three states
that are not participating).
207. See Bridenbaugh v. Carter, 532 U.S. 1002 (2001).
208. See Jacob Gaffney, Supreme Court Refuses to Hear Indiana Residents' Wine-Shipping
Lawsuit,
WINE
SPECTATOR
ONLINE,
Apr.,
23,
2001,
at
http://www.winespectator.com/Wine/Daily/News/0,l 145,407,00.html.
209. See id.
210. See id.
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2. Texas
Following the Seventh Circuit's decision in Bridenbaugh, Judge
Harmon of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Texas granted a motion for reconsideration in Dickerson v. Bailey211 to
allow the parties to address the impact of Bridenbaugh. In Dickerson,
Texas residents wishing to receive wine shipments directly from out-ofstate suppliers sued the administrator of the state Alcohol Beverage
Commission ("ABC"), claiming that a Texas statute prohibiting those
sales violated the dormant Commerce Clause.21 2 Upon reconsideration,
Judge Harmon adhered to her prior determination that the statute was
unconstitutional, finding that it imposed "differing burdens on in- and
out-of-state [wine] producers so as to favor in-state wineries." 2 13 Judge
Harmon held that Texas' statutory ban on direct importation of out-ofstate wine by Texas residents for personal consumption violated the
dormant Commerce Clause. 2 14 "Because out-of-state producers must go
through Texas-licensed wholesalers and retailers to sell wine in Texas,
they suffer higher costs which translate into higher prices, which in turn
affect their ability to compete with local Texas wineries.25
Furthermore, the court held that the Texas ABC law was not "saved" by
the Twenty-First Amendment because the state failed "to demonstrate
how a statutory exception for local wineries from Texas' three-tier
regulatory system.., is justified by any
of the traditional core concerns
216
of the [T]wenty-[F]irst Amendment.,
In this well-written and convincing opinion, Judge Harmon
identified a crucial problem in Judge Easterbrook's opinion.
Easterbrook's ruling is based on the history of the Twenty-First
Amendment, which he limited to before and around the time of its
enactment, and on the language of Section 2.217 Harmon, convincingly,
pointed out that both bases of interpretation are incorrect. After
reviewing the ratification debates of the Amendment, Harmon drew on
academic studies to conclude that the plain meaning of the text and the
legislative history "fails to reveal clearly any unified Congressional
211. 212 F. Supp. 2d 673 (S.D. Tex. 2002).
212. See id. at 674-75.
213. Id. at 694.
214. See id.
215. Id. at694-95.
216. Id. at 695. The "core concerns" of the Twenty-First Amendment are promoting
temperance, raising revenue, and insuring orderly market conditions. See id. at 682.
217. See id at680.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2003

23

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 4 [2003], Art. 14

HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 31:1303

intent in enacting ... section [2]. ' ' 2 18 Comments of various senators
during the ratification debates support three different interpretations of
Section 2.219 At the time of the ratification debates, Section 2 was
viewed as primarily a procedural section, necessary to support and
implement Section 1.220 Therefore, if there is no definitive guidance on
the issue from the text or the history of the Twenty-First Amendment,
then the task of interpretation must be left to the Supreme Court.221
However, because Easterbrook viewed Section 2 as giving states an
absolute right to regulate the importation and distribution of alcohol, "he
did not discuss the last forty years of Supreme Court jurisprudence
relating to balancing and harmonizing the dormant Commerce Clause
and [Section] 2 of the [T]wenty-[F]irst [A]mendment. ' '222 Easterbrook
determined "that since the establishment of Indiana's three-tier system
was fully authorized by the [T]wenty-[F]irst [A]mendment
.... no
223
necessary.
was
analysis
Clause]
further [Commerce
In neglecting a dormant Commerce Clause analysis, Judge
Easterbrook ignored an important point raised by Judge Harmon-by
requiring even small, "family-run" wineries to go through wholesalers,
many of them are blocked from access to out-of-state markets, thus
discriminating against them. 224 The plight of small, out-of-state wineries
was "inconspicuous or insignificant to Judge Easterbrook. '' 225 Harmon's
critique of Easterbrook's flawed analysis is excellent and could serve as
a model analysis for other jurisdictions.
3. Florida
In Bainbridge v. Bush,226 the plaintiffs alleged that the Florida
direct shipment law violated the Commerce Clause by discriminating
against interstate wine sales and protecting economic interests of in-state
business, and by regulating sales transactions that occur in other
states.227 The district judge upheld Florida's direct shipment law relying
on a completely different constitutional analysis than the Seventh Circuit
in the Indiana case. Whereas Judge Easterbrook concluded that the
218.

Id. at 682.

219. See id. at 680-81.
220. See id. at 681.
221.

See id

222.
223.

Id. at 682.
Id. at 686.

224.

See Bolick, supra note 37.

225.

Id.

226.

148 F. Supp. 2d 1306 (M.D. Fla. 2001).

227.

See id at 1308.
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Indiana law was not discriminatory, in Bainbridge the court agreed that
the Florida law did discriminate against out-of-state wineries.
Nevertheless, the court found that although Florida's direct shipment law
violates the dormant Commerce Clause, it represents a permissible
regulation under the Twenty-First Amendment. 228 The district court
wrote that where there are mixed motives, both legitimate and
protectionist, behind the enactment of a facially discriminatory statute
regulating alcoholic beverages, the legitimate motives are sufficient to
save the statute from being unconstitutional. 229 The judge found that
Florida's express goals were to deal with what Florida perceived to be a
"threat to the public health, safety, and welfare; to state revenue
collections; and to the economy of the state," all of which fall within the
recognized core concerns of the Twenty-First Amendment. 230 The court
concluded that "the numerous interests promoted by the Florida statutory
scheme, including temperance, revenue protection, and the reduction of
diversion and bootlegging
outweigh the minimal burden placed on
231
interstate commerce.,
The Eleventh Circuit Court, however, vacated and remanded the
2 32
case, ordering the district court judge to consider more evidence.
Circuit Judge Tjoflat held that if Florida could demonstrate that its
statutory scheme was closely related to the core concern of the TwentyFirst Amendment of raising revenue and not a pretext for mere
protectionism, Florida's statutory scheme could be upheld against a
dormant Commerce Clause challenge.233 While the court of appeals
agreed with the district court's determination that the Florida direct
shipping ban was facially discriminatory, it found that a question of fact
remained as to whether the "regulatory scheme is so closely related to
the core concern
of raising revenue as to escape Commerce Clause
4
scrutiny.,

23

In its decision the court dismissed two of the three "core concerns"
alleged by the state; it said that the current laws were not the only way of
preventing alcohol sales to minors or of ensuring orderly markets. The
judges noted that they were not sure exactly what "'ensuring orderly
markets' ... means, but it certainly does not mean discrimination in a

228. Seeid. at 1315.
229. Seeid. at l313.
230. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
231. Id. at 1315 (footnote omitted).
232. See Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1106 (11 th Cir. 2002).
233. Seeid.atlll5.
234. Id.
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way that effectively forecloses out-of-state firms from the Florida
market., 235 In addressing the other "core concern" of excise taxes, the
court asked, "Why, exactly, must Florida engage in this discriminatory
scheme to effectuate its desire to raise revenue? '23 6 These issues will be
reconsidered by the district court.
4. New York
In Swedenburg v. Kelly237 the plaintiffs were the owner of a winery
in Virginia, the owner of a winery in California, and three New York
consumers. 238 The defendants, the Chairman and Commissioners of the
New York State Liquor Authority, were joined by several wholesalers
who intervened to file a joint motion to dismiss the plaintiffs'
complaint. 239 The plaintiffs claimed that a New York state alcohol
statute violates the rights of all the plaintiffs to freedom of commerce
guaranteed by the Commerce Clause. 240 In a decisive victory for direct
shipment proponents, District Court Judge Berman found for the
plaintiffs and held that it is unconstitutional for New York to bar direct
shipments of wine to consumers from out-of-state producers while
allowing direct sales by wineries inside the state.24 1 In his opinion, Judge
Berman stated that "[t]here is evidence that the direct shipping ban was
designed to protect New York State businesses from out-of-state
competition. ' 242 Judge Berman made it clear that New York cannot
exercise its power under the Twenty-First Amendment as a pretext for
economic protectionism. 243 Berman rejected the argument that there is
any temperance or tax justification for prohibiting direct shipment. 244 He
said that the legitimate state interests protected by the Twenty-First
Amendment, such as promoting temperance, banning the sale of wine to
minors, and raising tax revenues, could be addressed through other
nondiscriminatory means.245 In solving the constitutional problem,
Berman suggested one possibility would be to eliminate the direct235.

Id.

236. Id.
237.

No. Civ. 0778, 2000 WL 1264285 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2000).

238.

See Swedenburg v. Kelly, 232 F. Supp.,2d 135, 136-37 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).

239. See id. at 137.
240. See id. New York state currently allows in-state wineries to ship directly to their New
York customers, but prohibits out-of-state producers from doing the same. The latter must distribute

all their
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

wine through the three-tier system, selling it to a wholesaler who then resells it to retailers.
Seeid. at136.
Id.
at 148.
See id.
See id.
at 148-50.
See id at 150.
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shipping ban; another would be to eliminate exceptions in the law, like
the one that allows wineries in New York State to sell directly to
consumers.2 46 Following his ruling, Judge Berman issued an injunction
preventing New York State from enforcing its current ban on interstate
direct shipments of wine to consumers. 247 This opinion will not change
the situation for consumers immediately because the ruling is stayed
while the defendants prepare their appeal.24 8 Judge Berman indicated
that "the issue would ultimately have to be settled by the New York state
legislature. 249 If the Second Circuit upheld this decision, state
legislators would still have a choice between overhauling their rules on
wine shipping or simply removing the exemption for local wineries. 250
5. Virginia
In Bolick v. Roberts,25 1 consumers of wine in Virginia and out-ofstate growers and producers of wine brought an action against the
Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, challenging Virginia's
regulatory scheme involving the shipment and distribution of alcoholic
beverages. 252 District Judge Williams held that the statutory scheme
requiring all liquor to pass through hands of state-licensed entity was
discriminatory and, thus, unconstitutional.25 3
In his opinion Judge Williams noted that the statute was facially
discriminatory because Virginia producer licensees do not have to pass
their products through a wholesale tier although out-of-state entities
must. 254 The court found that Virginia had not established "that there are
255
no other nondiscriminatory means of enforcing legitimate interests,,
and held that256the Twenty-First Amendment did not shield the direct
shipping ban.

Judge Williams viewed Easterbrook's decision in Bridenbaugh as
incorrectly decided because it did not apply established dormant
246. See id. at 153.
247. See Dana Nigro, FederalJudge Rules New York Can't Enforce Interstate Wine-Shipping
Ban, Dec. 10, 2002, at http://www.winespectator.com/Wine/Daily/News/0, 1145,1915,00.html; see
also Katy McLaughlin, New York Court Gives Wineries Partial Victory, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11,

2002, at D3.
248.

See Nigro, supra note 247.

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id
See id
199 F. Supp. 2d 397 (E.D. Va. 2002).
See id. at 401.
See id.
at 450-51.
See id. at 407-09.
Id. at 409.
Seeid. at413.
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Commerce Clause analysis and ignored the interstate commerce issues
raised by the facts of the case.257 Williams further concluded that Judge
Easterbrook's analysis of the history and the text of Section 2 was very
narrow and disregarded the evolution of case law consistent with that
text and history in the twentieth century. 8
6. North Carolina
In Beskind v. Easley,259 the plaintiffs, comprised of North Carolina
residents who enjoy drinking wine and a small California winery,
challenged several provisions of North Carolina's ABC laws as
unconstitutional violations of the Commerce Clause. 260 District Court
Judge Mullen held that the challenged provisions of North Carolina's
alcohol statutes directly discriminated against out-of-state wine
manufacturers and that the Twenty-First Amendment did not empower
the state to favor local liquor industries by enacting barriers to
competition.261 While the court stated that North Carolina was allowed
to use the Twenty-First Amendment to protect the overall three-tier
system because it promotes the core purpose of the Twenty-First
Amendment, the court concluded that North Carolina cannot use the
Amendment to protect the direct shipment ban from the Commerce
2 62
Clause because the ban does not fulfill a purpose of the Amendment.
The court enjoined North Carolina from enforcing the provisions of the
law "that prohibit or punish out-of-state wine dealers from directly
shipping wines to adult North Carolina residents. 26 3
In an in-depth opinion, Judge Mullen concluded that plaintiffs were
not challenging the three-tier system, but rather North Carolina's failure
to apply that system uniformly and even-handedly to in-state and out-ofstate wineries. 264 Emphasizing that the State failed to present any reason
for applying its ABC laws unevenly in its exception for local wineries,
Mullen concluded that the only explanation was "protection of local
economic interests, which the Commerce Clause will not tolerate. 265 In

257.

See id. at 408.

258. See id. at 430-33. In response to Judge Williams decision, the Virginia General Assembly
passed measures that would allow the direct shipment of wine in and out of the state. See Ginsberg,
supranote 128.
259. 197 F. Supp. 2d 464 (W.D.N.C. 2002).
260. See id. at 466.

261.

See id. at475-76.

262.

See id.at 474.

263.

Id. at 476.

264.

See id. at 470.

265.

Id. at 472.
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his opinion, Judge Mullen applied a balancing test and identified the
"correct inquiry" as "'whether the interests implicated by a state
regulation are so closely related to the powers preserved by the Twentythat
[F]irst Amendment that the regulation may prevail, notwithstanding
266
its requirements directly conflict with express federal policies.'
As a remedy for the violation of the Commerce Clause, Mullen
suggests that it is the job of the legislature and not the court, to design a
non-discriminatory regulatory structure for the sale of alcoholic
beverages in North Carolina.26 7 The court enjoined the defendants from
enforcing the statutes.268
7. Washington
In Mast v. Long,269 the plaintiffs are law students who seek to
purchase wine directly from sources outside the State of Washington.27 °
The plaintiffs allege that the "existing system is unconstitutional because
it violates the 'dormant' Commerce Clause and the First
Amendment., 271 What is different about this case from the previously
discussed cases is that Washington is a reciprocity state, and its laws on
direct shipping are among the most liberal. The court in this case
abstained from making any decision because the plaintiffs wanted to
bring more than the statutory two liters of wine into the State without
paying a penalty tax-a State tax issue the court believed belonged in
state court.272 This case is inconsequential in advancing the direct
shipment issue.
8. Michigan
In Heald v. Engler,273 the district court found "that direct shipment
laws are a permissible exercise of state power under [section] 2 of the
[Twenty-First] Amendment., 274 Michigan's three-tier distribution
system contained an "exemption" that allowed in-state wineries, but not
out-of-state wineries, to ship directly to consumers. 275 The court
determined that because the Twenty-First Amendment gave states
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id. (citation omitted).
See id. at 476.
See id.
No. CS-01-298-FVS, 2002 WL 31039421 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 9, 2002).
Seeid at*1.
Id.
See id. at *6.
No. 00 Civ. 71438, slip. op. (E.D. Mich. Sept. 28, 2001).
Id. at 8.
See id.at 3-4.
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"virtually complete control" over alcohol regulation, a state's action
pursuant to the Twenty-First Amendment would violate the Commerce
Clause only if it constituted "mere economic protectionism. '276 In the
court's opinion, Michigan's law was not mere economic protectionism
because it was designed to "ensure the collection of
taxes" and "reduce
277
the risk of alcohol falling into the hands of minors."
9. Summary of the Decisions
As of the writing of this Note, federal district courts have struck
down direct shipment prohibition laws in New York, North Carolina,
Texas, and Virginia, while in Indiana, Florida, and Michigan the district
courts upheld the states' rights to prohibit direct shipment of wine. In the
first case to reach a U.S. Court of Appeals, the Seventh Circuit upheld
Indiana's ban on out-of-state direct shipping. In Bridenbaugh v.
Freeman-Wilson, the Seventh Circuit relied heavily on the Twenty-First
Amendment, Section 2 which grants the states considerable authority to
regulate alcoholic beverages.278 The court in Bridenbaugh found that
Indiana's direct-shipping restrictions fall within this authority.2 79 In
effect, the court concluded that when it comes to alcoholic beverages,
states have authority under the Twenty-First Amendment to enact
measures that may otherwise violate the Commerce Clause.
However, a more recent Eleventh Circuit decision, handled the
constitutional battle between the Twenty-First Amendment and the
Commerce Clause very differently. In reviewing a district court decision
upholding Florida's direct-shipping law, the Eleventh Circuit in
Bainbridge v. Turner criticized Bridenbaugh and held that the TwentyFirst Amendment can trump the Commerce Clause only under limited
circumstances. 2 80 The Eleventh Circuit decision, along with the wellreasoned opinions by Judge Harmon in Texas and Judge Williams in
Virginia provide a comprehensive framework for addressing the direct
shipment issue.

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Id. at 9 (quoting Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
Id. at 10.
See Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 227 F.3d 848, 851 (7th Cir. 2000).
See id. at 854.
See Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1106 (11 th Cir. 2002).
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IV.

ELEVENTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE

This next section is not meant to apply the substance of the
Eleventh Amendment 28 to the direct shipment of wine issue. Rather, it
is an attempt to use the reasoning of the Supreme Court in recent
Eleventh Amendment decisions to predict the outcome if the direct
shipment of wine issue comes before the Court. While district court
decisions in New York, Texas, and Virginia and the Eleventh Circuit
decision make very convincing and logical arguments as to why a state's
ban on the direct shipment of wine is unconstitutional, it would be naive
to ignore the weight the Supreme Court has given to protecting states'
rights and the "dignity of the states." What follows in this section is an
analysis of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence that suggests how the
Court views state sovereignty. The Court's Eleventh Amendment
decisions are relevant to the direct shipment cases because they indicate
the Court's predilection for giving the states increased regulatory
control. It is a very small step to conclude that the Twenty-First
Amendment gives states unfettered control over alcoholic beverage
regulation, unhampered by Commerce Clause considerations.
When Justice William Rehnquist became Chief Justice in 1986, the
Court embarked on a mission to return power to the states.2 2 A slim
majority of the Supreme Court has over the past decade expanded states'
immunities against federal authority. Nearly all of the recent Supreme
Court cases affecting federalism have been 5-4 decisions, with the
majority composed of the Chief Justice and Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas. 83
The issue in these cases is one that was debated during our
country's founding-the rights of the individual states versus the power
of federal authority. Since Rehnquist's reign as Chief Justice, the
conservative majority has used the Eleventh Amendment to the United
States Constitution to justify the expansion of the sovereign immunity
enjoyed by the states. 84 The idea that states should be immune from
lawsuits comes from the notion that immunity is necessary to preserve

281.

U.S. CONST. amend. X1 states, "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be

construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
282. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002); Bd. of Tr. of
the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000);
Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
283.

See generally infra note 286 and accompanying text.

284. See generally id.
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the people's idea that the sovereign is "a superior being" and that states'
"dignity" must be protected.285 Promoting the common law doctrine of
sovereign immunity, the current Supreme Court has used it to shield
states from damages for age discrimination, disability discrimination,
and the violation
of patents, trademarks, copyrights, and fair labor
286
standards.
As one commentator has written, the Eleventh Amendment is a
mess-it is the "home of self-contradiction, transparent fiction, and
arbitrary stops in reasoning." 287 Furthermore, "[a]ny hope of doctrinal
stability is undermined by shifting paradigms, as the Eleventh
Amendment is inconsistently conceptualized as a form of sovereign
immunity, as an exception to federal jurisdiction, and as a structural
constraint on the powers of the national government., 288 Understanding
this confusion is important because the Eleventh Amendment is a vital
element of federal jurisdiction that defines the federal system and affects
289
the balance of power between the United States and its states.
For much of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court interpreted
the Constitution to empower the federal government to deal with
national problems. Now, though, the Court is restricting congressional
powers and aggressively protecting state governments from lawsuits by
private individuals. 290 This shift in constitutional law jurisprudence has
generated many articles concerning federalism, state sovereign
immunity, and the expansion of the Eleventh Amendment. 29' As a result
of reviving federalism as a constraint on national power, dozens of
federal laws are now being challenged in federal court. 292 The newly
expanded concepts of sovereignty and sovereign immunity have become
the Court's way of restricting the powers of Congress and enlarging the
285. See JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT
SIDES WITH THE STATES, 41-57 (2002).
286. See David G. Savage, Strongly Stated: In Win for Federalism, State's Can 't Be Brought to

Administrative Hearings, ABA J., July 2002, at 29.
287. John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L.
REV. 47, 47 (1998) (footnotes omitted).
288. Id. (footnotes omitted).
289. See Mark D. Shaffer, Reigning in the Rehnquist Court's Expansion of State Sovereign
Immunity: A Market Participant Exception, 23 WHITTIER L. REV. 10 11,1025-26 (2002).

290. Seeid.atlO12-13.
291. See, e.g.,
Richard F. Russell, State Sovereign Immunity and the Pulse ofthe United States
Supreme Court, 38 TENN. B.J. 29 (2002); Ronald D. Rotunda, The Eleventh Amendment, Garrett,
and Protection for Civil Rights, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1183 (2002); Christina Bohannan, Beyond
Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity: State Waivers, Private Contracts, and Federal Incentives, 77

N.Y.U. L. REV. 273 (2002); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "'Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist
Court's Federalism Decisions,69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002).
292. See infra notes 300-305 and accompanying text.
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areas where the states can escape effective control by Congress. 29 3 Under
Congress' express constitutional powers, Congress can create standards
that are as applicable to the fifty states as they are to any individual.294
The standards apply to the states, but as the Supreme Court has now
determined, they cannot be enforced by a private person seeking
damages from the states. 295 The standards exist, giving rights to private
persons but without providing them a remedy.296 A right without a
remedy is the odd consequence the Supreme Court has endorsed by
protecting the sovereignty of the states.297
The history of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence from inception
until the present day makes it clear that the Supreme Court has extended
the scope of state sovereign immunity and has limited Congress's power
to authorize suits against the states. Specifically, the Court has thrown
out suits brought by a Florida State University professor who said he
was paid less because of his age, 298 an Alabama hospital nurse who said
she was demoted after battling breast cancer, 299 and a Maine probation
worker who was not paid for his overtime work. 300 The Court also barred
suits against state agencies over stolen patents, trademarks, or
copyrights, all violations of federal law. 30 ' Thus, although Congress has
attempted to give individuals federal statutory rights against the states,
the Supreme Court's view of the Eleventh Amendment and sovereign
immunity has foreclosed
much of the judicial relief that gives meaning
30 2
rights.
federal
those
to
Starting in 1890 in Hans v. Louisiana,30 3 the Supreme Court
grappled with the question of whether the Eleventh Amendment barred a
citizen from suing his or her own state in federal court, even though the
Amendment itself makes no mention of this scenario.30 4 Quoting
Alexander Hamilton from Federalist Number 81 the Court stated, "[i]t is
inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an
individual without its consent. 30 5 Therefore, the Court concluded that
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

See NOONAN, supra note 285, at 4-5.
See id.
See id
See id. at 4.
See id.
See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 70 (2000).
See Bd. ofTr. of the Univ. ofAla. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 711 (1999).
See Bohannan, supra note 294, at 274.
See id
134 U.S. 1 (1889).
See id.at 4.
Id. at 13. (italics omitted).
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the Eleventh Amendment bars individuals from suing their own states. 306
This decision was particularly significant because it was the Court's first
departure from the literal text of the Eleventh Amendment.3 °7 In addition
to making state immunity central, Hans brought into the discourse of the
Supreme Court the opinions on immunity of Alexander Hamilton, James
Madison, and John Marshall, providing the modem Court a reference
and precedent for expanding the sovereign immunity doctrine.3 °8
After Hans, it appeared unlikely that a federal court could ever
compel a state to act, even if the state violated the Constitution or a
federal statute. 30 9 To get around Hans, when shareholders of several
railroads alleged that a Minnesota statute regulating railroad rates
violated the Fourteenth Amendment, they sued not the state, but the
state's Attorney General, Edward Young, for a temporary restraining
order prohibiting him from enforcing the legislation in question.3 1 °
Young claimed that the Eleventh Amendment barred the suit, but the
Supreme Court held that "[t]he State has no power to impart to [the
Attorney General] any immunity from responsibility to the supreme
authority of the United States.",31 ' Therefore, Ex parte Young held that
the Eleventh Amendment applies only to the states themselves, and
plaintiffs could obtain injunctive (prospective) relief against a state by
suing a state official.31 2 This decision gave private citizens a way to
challenge unconstitutional state action by "stripping" officers of the state
of their official status.
More than half a century later, the ability of private citizens to
challenge unconstitutional state action was severely limited in Edelman
v. Jordan 313 when the Supreme Court began to lay down new restrictive
interpretations of what the Eleventh Amendment proscribed. In
Edelman, the Court held that a class of intended welfare recipients could
not sue state officials for retroactive payment of benefits. 314 Edelman
held that the Eleventh Amendment barred an action against a state
official that resulted in retrospective monetary awards likely to be paid

306. See id.
at 16.
307. See Michael P. Kenny, Sovereign Immunity and the Rule of Law: Aspiring to a HighestRanked View of the Eleventh Amendment, 1 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 1,2 (1992).
308. See NOONAN, supra note 285, at 75.

309. See Kenny, supra note 307, at2.
310. SeeExparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 126 (1908).
311. Id.
at160.
312.

See id at 167-68.

313. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
314. Seeid. at678.
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by the State.31 5 The Court stated that a suit "seeking to impose a liability
which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by
the Eleventh Amendment. 3 1 6 The effect of that decision was to permit
federal courts to require state officials to comply in the future with
claims payment provisions of the welfare assistance sections of the
Social Security Act, but federal courts could not entertain claims seeking
payment of funds found to be wrongfully withheld in the past.317
Conceding that some of the characteristics of prospective and retroactive
relief would have the same effects on the state treasury, the Court
suggested that retroactive payments were equivalent to the imposition of
liabilities that must be paid from public funds in the state treasury, and
that this was barred by the Eleventh Amendment.31 8 In describing why it
drew the line between prospective and retrospective relief, the Court said
that remedies designed to end a continuing violation of federal law are
necessary to vindicate the federal interest in assuring the supremacy of
that law whereas a compensatory or deterrence interest is insufficient to
overcome the dictates of the Eleventh Amendment. 3 19Accordingly, this
case held that suits against states and their officials seeking damages for
past injuries are firmly foreclosed by the Eleventh Amendment.32 °
Congress' power to abrogate a state's sovereign immunity under
the Commerce Clause and hold states to federal legislative requirements
took a hard hit in the landmark decision Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida.32' Seminole cut deeply into the powers of Congress over the
states. Even where the Constitution vests in Congress complete
lawmaking authority over a particular area, the Court declared that the
states cannot be made liable for damages when they violate federal
law.322 The Seminole Tribe filed suit against the State of Florida in
federal court to compel negotiations under the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act ("IGRA").323 IGRA was enacted pursuant to the
32 4
Commerce Clause and authorized suits against states in federal court.
The Court rejected the plaintiffs argument that Congress could abrogate
state sovereign immunity to enforce legislation enacted pursuant to the
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

Seeid. at667.
Id. at 663 (citation omitted).
See id.
at 668.
See id.
Seeid
See id. at 663.
517 U.S. 44 (1996).
See id at47, 72.
See id, at 51-52.
See id.
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Commerce Clause. 325 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist
concluded that "[e]ven when the Constitution vests in Congress
complete lawmaking authority over a particular area, the Eleventh
Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private
parties against unconsenting States. 32 6 Rehnquist further stated that,
"Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional limitations
placed upon federal jurisdiction., 32 7 The Court explained that Congress
could, however, still abrogate a state's sovereign immunity pursuant to
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment because it was adopted after the
Eleventh Amendment and that the sole focus of Section 5 is legislation
directed at the states. 328 The Court concluded that Article I powers such
as the commerce power, on the other hand, do not override the Eleventh
Amendment. 329 Since Seminole Tribe was decided in 1996, the Supreme
Court has been moving to reduce the accountability of the states for not
complying with federal legislation.3 3 °
In 1999, the Supreme Court drastically expanded state sovereign
immunity in Alden v. Maine.33 1 In Alden, a group of probation officers
sued their employer, the State of Maine, for monetary damages in
federal court alleging that the State had violated the overtime provisions
of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").3 32 The District Court
dismissed the action after the Supreme Court in Seminole Tribe ruled
that Congress could not subject unconsenting states to suit in federal
court pursuant to its Article I powers. 333 The petitioners then filed the
suit in state court pursuant to language in the FLSA purporting to
authorize private actions against states in their own courts, a practice not
banned by Seminole Tribe or the Eleventh Amendment.3 34 Closing this
abrogation loophole, the Court held that "the powers delegated to
Congress under Article I of the United States Constitution do not include
the power to subject nonconsenting States to private suits for damages in
state courts. 33 5 What was particularly notable about Alden was that for
the first time the Court recognized state sovereign immunity existing

325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

See id.
at 65-66.
Id.at 72.
Id. at 73.
See id. at 65-66.
See id. at 72-73.

330. See NOONAN, supra note 285, at 120.

331.
332.
333.
334.
335.

527 U.S. 706 (1999).
See id at 711-12.
See id. at 712.
See id.
Id.
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independent of the Eleventh Amendment. Justice Kennedy wrote: "[T]he
sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited by,
the terms of the Eleventh Amendment" but rather "'the States' immunity
from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States
enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution .... ,,336 This new
conception of sovereign immunity not directly derived from the
Eleventh Amendment helps the Court expand the scope of the immunity
and also opens the Court to greater criticism for its judicial activism. As
one commentator has noted, "the Supreme Court has failed to adequately
explain how the immunities derive from the text of the Constitution ....
[T]he texts of the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments simply do not
provide for such immunities and constitutional
structure, while a useful
337
aid to interpretation, is not itself text.
The Supreme Court's policy considerations for making law
regarding states' sovereign immunity are explicitly mentioned in its
most recent decision concerning sovereign immunity.338 In May of 2002,
the Court's conservative wing continued to enhance the immunity of the
states and to curtail Congress' power when it extended the principle of
sovereign immunity from lawsuits in federal court to adjudicative
hearings by federal agencies. 339 The dispute arose when the South
Carolina State Ports Authority ("SCSPA") refused to berth a cruise ship
that offered gambling.34 ° Officials said they did not want gambling ships
operating out of Charleston, but the ship's sponsors countered that
another shipping line berthed two ships that offered casino gambling.34'
The cruise ship company filed a complaint against the SCSPA with the
Federal Maritime Commission ("FMC"), seeking reparations and
injunctive relief for alleged violations of the Shipping Act of 1984.42
Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas held that state sovereign
immunity bars the FMC from adjudicating complaints filed by a private
party against a non-consenting State. 343 Because "administrative
proceedings bear a remarkably strong resemblance to civil litigation in
federal courts[,]" the same rule of state immunity should apply to both,
stated Justice Thomas speaking for the 5-4 majority. 344 He was joined by
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

Id. at 713.
Shaffer, supra note 289, at 1022 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
See Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002).
See id.
at 747.
See id
Seeid. at 748.
See id.
See id. at 768-69.
Id. at 757.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy.
According to Thomas, it would be an "affront to the state's dignity" to
force it to respond to complaints by individuals and private
companies.34 5 Thomas emphasized that the primary purpose of the
Eleventh Amendment was to preserve a state's dignity, not its
treasury. 346 Thomas stated that "[t]he preeminent purpose of state
sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that is consistent with
their status as sovereign entities. 347
Justice Thomas concluded that "[b]y guarding against
encroachments by the Federal Government on fundamental aspects of
state sovereignty, such as sovereign immunity, we strive to maintain the
balance of power embodied in our Constitution and thus to 'reduce the
risk of tyranny and abuse from either front."' 348 This decision highlights
how the majority is adamant in protecting state's rights-the majority
immunized states from certain proceedings before federal administrative
agencies which, as part of the executive branch, do not even exercise the
"judicial power" to which the Eleventh Amendment is addressed. The
Court mentioned "that [w]hile state sovereign immunity serves the
important function of shielding state treasuries and thus preserving 'the
' '349
States' ability to govern in accordance with the will of their citizens,
the doctrine's central purpose is to "accord States the dignity that is
consistent with their status as sovereign entities., 350 The Court made it
clear that the relief sought by a plaintiff suing a state is irrelevant to the
question of whether the suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 35' It
is clear that this Court is committed to a policy of federalism allowing
states to govern themselves with as little interference from the federal
government as possible.
The dissent in many of the sovereign immunity cases questions
where the majority finds in the Constitution the principle of law that
allows the expansion of states' sovereign immunity. Led by Justice
Souter, the dissenters in these cases argue that the "interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment that a majority of this Court has embraced is
fundamentally mistaken. 352 Justice Souter has stated that Alden's
345. Id at 760.
346. See id. at 769.
347. Id. at 760 (citation omitted).
348. Id. at 769 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1998)).
349. Id. at 765 (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 750-51 (1999)).
350. Fed Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 760.
351. See id. at 766.
352. Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 649 n.1 (2002) (Souter, J.,
concurring).
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"conception of state sovereign immunity... is true neither to history nor
to the structure of the Constitution."' 353 Furthermore, Souter asserted in
Seminole Tribe
that the "indignity" rationale is "embarrassingly
354
insufficient.,
Justice Breyer's dissent in FederalMaritime Commission notes that
the practical result of the Court's current policy is to keep citizens from
acting as private attorney generals to enforce federal law.355 Although
the Justice Department and federal agencies can themselves bring
actions against States for violating federal law, as a practical matter, they
do not because they lack the resources do to so. 35 6 As Breyer points out,
federal agencies would have to rely heavily upon their own informal
staff investigations in order to decide whether a citizen's complaint has
merit. 357 "The natural result [of this] is less agency flexibility, a larger
federal bureaucracy, less fair procedure, and potentially less effective
law enforcement. 3 58
Siding with the dissent in opposing the Court's expansion of the
state's immunity from the reach of federal law, one commentator has
written that this expansion has occurred "without justification of any
kind,' '359 threatening "intolerable injury to the enforcement of federal
standards," 360 and warning of the "danger to the exercise of democratic
government. '361 Furthermore, no justification for the immunity accorded
to the fifty states has been shown. 362 Using City of Boerne v. Flores363 as
an example, author and federal judge for the Ninth Circuit John Noonan
contends that the Supreme Court, as the devotee of dignity, "has
embraced with mistaken enthusiasm a doctrine of state immunity that is
overextended, unjustified by history, and unworkable in any consistent
way. ' 364 Judge Noonan calls into question the Supreme Court majority's
argument that immunity is important because "the dignity of the state

353. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 814 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting).
354. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 97 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
355. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 781.
356. See idat 781-82.
357. See id.
at785.
358. Id.
359. NOONAN, supra note 285, at 154.
360. Id. at 155.
361. Id. at 140.
362. See id. at 10.
363. 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding the Religious Freedom Restoration Act unconstitutional as
applied to state and local governments and that Congress cannot expand rights or create new rights
pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
364. NOONAN, supra note 285, at 11.
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demands it."' 365 States are not people; people have dignity Noonan
contends, and thus, the argument that state immunity has a moral quality
of dignity is "inexplicable." 366 Since states can't blush, all the attributes
of dignity that are attributed to a person do not make sense when applied
to a fictional entity.367 The claim that the sovereignty of the states is
constitutional rests on the pretense that the idea of state sovereignty is
somehow incorporated in the Eleventh Amendment. 368 The
constitutional connection referring to state sovereignty as an Eleventh
Amendment matter is imaginary. 369 Neither the text nor the legislative
history of the Eleventh Amendment supports this claim.370 In his
conclusion, Noonan harshly criticizes the Supreme Court's protection of
the immunity of the states when he writes:
No reason in the [C]onstitution or in the nature of things or in the acts
of Congress supplies an answer [to the question of why a state should
have immunity]. The states are permitted to act unjustly only because
the highest court in the land has, by its 371
own will, moved the middle
power.
nation's
the
narrowed
and
ground
V.

ANALYSIS: THE WINE WAR OUTCOME INLIGHT OF CURRENT
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE

In light of recent Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence where the
Supreme Court has tipped the scales of federalism in favor of states'
rights and states' sovereign immunity, it is unfortunate but likely that the
Court, if it chooses to hear one of the several cases challenging the right
of states to prohibit the direct shipment of wine from out-of-state
producers to the homes of in-state consumers, would hold that the
prohibitory statutes are constitutional.
Given the circuit court splits on the issue of the direct shipment of
wine and the growing publicity of the issue, the stage is now set for the
direct shipment battle to move to the Supreme Court. The reasoning in
the New York, Texas, and Virginia cases are most persuasive,
particularly because they demonstrate how Section 2 of the Twenty-First

365. Id. at 154.
366. Id.
367. See Power to the State (roundtable discussion), ABA J. 39, 42 (Jan. 2003) (comments by
Erwin Chermerinsky, Professor of Law).
368. See NOONAN, supra note 285, at 151-52.
369. See id.
at 152.
370. See id
371. Id.at 156.
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Amendment can be harmonized with the dormant Commerce Clause. As
discussed in those cases, the Twenty-First Amendment was not meant to
trump the Commerce Clause whenever a conflict arises. The Commerce
Clause should trump Twenty-First Amendment regulation if permissible
goals such as temperance or revenue-raising are accomplished by instate favoritism when they can be accomplished by other means. With
the issue of direct shipment, it is clear that the state laws prohibiting
direct shipment are a vestigial structure remaining from the days
following Prohibition and are perpetuated by state legislatures only for
economic protectionism and encouraged by wholesalers to increase
profits. Because other, non-discriminatory methods can be used by the
state to regulate alcohol, the state direct shipment laws violate the
Commerce Clause, and the Twenty-First Amendment does not make that
violation constitutional.
Nevertheless, based on this nation's history of alcohol regulation
and the present Court's interest in promoting states' rights as evidenced
by recent Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, it is far from clear that if
faced with the direct shipment issue, the Supreme Court would decide
against the states. The dissent in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias372 (the
Hawaii liquor tax case) may be particularly useful in understanding how
the Court might view the direct shipment issue. The three dissenters in
that case in 1984 were Justices Stevens, Rehnquist, and O'Connor,373 all
of whom are still on the Court. The majority, none of whom are now on
the Court, held that Hawaii's tax exemption for pineapple liquor violated
the Commerce Clause because it discriminated in favor of in-state
products and that the tax was not saved by the Twenty-First
Amendment.374 In contrast, the dissenters asserted that the Commerce
Clause claim was foreclosed by the Twenty-First Amendment, and they
would have affirmed the constitutionality of the tax with its
exemption.37 5 If Justices Stevens, Rehnquist, and O'Connor would still
hold these opinions, it is likely they would be joined by Justices Scalia,

372. 468 U.S. 263 (1984). In Bacchus, the state of Hawaii acknowledged that it exempted
okolehao and pineapple wine from its liquor tax in order "to promote a local industry." Id at 276
(quoting Brief for Appellee Dias). The Court held that Hawaii liquor tax imposed on wholesale
sales of liquor but exempting certain locally produced beverages was an unconstitutional violation
of the Commerce Clause. See id. The Court noted with certainty that the purpose of the TwentyFirst Amendment was not to give states the authority to favor local liquor industries at the expense
of out-of-state competitors. See id.
373. See id. at 278.
374. See id.
at 273-74.
375. See id. at 279.
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Kennedy, and Thomas, creating a majority to uphold states' prohibitions
on direct shipment of wine.
Therefore, given the makeup of the Supreme Court and the Court's
recent Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, it is likely that the Court
will, unfortunately, uphold the power of the states to prohibit and limit
the direct shipment of wine from out-of-state. While some
commentators, including the author, may argue that prohibitions violate
the Commerce Clause, the Court, given its mission to protect the
"dignity" of the states, may interpret the Twenty-First Amendment as
trumping the Commerce Clause and allowing states to restrict and limit
the direct shipment of wine. If the "judicial power" of the Eleventh
Amendment can be equated with administrative proceedings in order to
allow states to avoid federal mandates, then surely dormant Commerce
Clause concerns (which do not appear in the text of the Constitution) can
fall to the Twenty-First Amendment in order to allow states unfettered
control over alcoholic beverages.
VI. CONCLUSION
Small wineries and wine consumers want the option of selling and
buying wine across state boundaries, and their demand is causing a
grassroots legal battle-one in which wineries have teamed with
consumers and free-trade groups against the alcoholic beverage
distributors and wholesalers. The main argument that opponents of state
bans on interstate shipments use is that the regulations violate the
Commerce Clause, which gives Congress the authority to regulate
interstate commerce and prohibits state discrimination against
nonresident businesses. Proponents of bans on direct shipment of wine
rely on the Twenty-First Amendment. The balance between the
Commerce Clause and the Twenty-First Amendment is currently
unclear. The differing approaches taken by the Seventh and Eleventh
Circuits increase the likelihood that the Supreme Court will eventually
take up the issue. While it seems like the "correct" constitutional
methodology for evaluating the direct shipment of wine issue lies in the
opinions of the district courts in New York, North Carolina, Texas, and
Virginia, (as well as the Eleventh Circuit opinion) the Supreme Court's
protection of the "dignity" of the states emphasized in recent Eleventh

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol31/iss4/14

42

Martin: A Toast to the Dignity of States: What Eleventh Amendment Jurispr
2003]

A TOAST TO THE DIGNITY OF STA TES

Amendment jurisprudence indicates that the Twenty-First Amendment
may trump the Commerce Clause and the economic protectionism of
state direct shipment laws will endure until legislatures change them.
Eric L. Martin*
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